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1 
Hayek’s Theory on Complexity and Knowledge. 
Dichotomies, Levels of Analysis, and Bounded Rationality 
 
Abstract. Hayek maintains that models of complexity must consider two closely interrelated factors: the 
large number of variables and the connections among them. These two conditions, which define complex 
phenomena, exhibit a different logical dimension. The former (the “large number of variables”) 
describes complexity in quantitative (numerical) terms; the latter provides a view of complex phenomena 
in logical-relational terms, and it is evoked to explain the emergent properties of the whole. Despite the 
close relation between these concepts, the first notion essentially prevails over the latter, delineating a 
distinctive configuration of the theory. This perspective also emerges when Hayek defines “dispersed” 
and “inarticulate” knowledge, and introduces the concept of the “explanations of the principles”. Finally, 
the notion of level of analysis is discussed in order to interpret Hayek’s two concepts which define 
complexity. 
 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: A12; B2; B4 
Keywords: complexity, dispersed knowledge, inarticulate knowledge, information, explanations of the 
principle; bounded rationality 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years various essays have been devoted to Hayek’s theory of complexity. 
They have focused on the close connection between his analysis of complex 
phenomena and market evolutionary theory (Vaughn, 1999; see also Weimer, 1982; 
Chaumont-Chandelier,1999; Wible 2000, Gaus, 2007). It has also been argued that 
Hayek’s theory shares many features with contemporary studies on complexity. In both 
approaches, self-organization of individuals units, adaptation processes, non-linearity, 
and path dependency connote complex systems whose (emergent) properties cannot be 
reduced to those of their parts (Vaughn, 1999). Yet it has been observed that Hayek’s 
“invisible hand” perspective conflicts with both inefficiency linked to “lock-in” effects 
determined by the technological path, and theories on complex adaptive behaviours 
which do not trust in the benevolent forces of the market (Kilpatrick, 2001). 
2 
In general, Hayek’s spontaneous, evolutionary, order and complex phenomena 
theories are interpreted as coherent parts of a homogeneous approach. This is correct, 
although Hayek dealt in some essays with “complex phenomena” as exhibiting 
distinctive epistemological features in some respects independent from the spontaneous 
order thesis (which appeared later than some of his epistemological contributions).1 
Hence, the following analysis describes Hayek’s specific analysis on complexity, and 
subsequently shows how it is connected to other parts of his theoretical apparatus. 
Especially in those essays (but also in other parts of his work), Hayek maintains 
that models of complexity consider two closely interwoven factors: a large number of 
variables, and the connections among them which generate the properties of a 
(complex) phenomenon. Over time, Hayek used this pattern to explain many events, 
from the appearance of spontaneous order to the nature of knowledge in market 
societies. A third element in Hayek’s view of complexity should be considered: the 
heterogeneity of systems’ constituents.2 Yet, this latter characteristic is less general in 
nature, so to speak, than the other two. In fact, it is evident in social systems, whose 
members are individuals, whilst it has an unclear function when it concerns the 
components of different, complex, systems (for example, the biological world; see 
section 1).  
The thesis put forward in this paper is that the two basic conditions which, 
according to Hayek, define complex phenomena (number of variables and their 
interconnections), firstly exhibit a different logical dimension; and secondly are such 
that the former tacitly prevails over the latter as the explanatory term. As a 
consequence, the unitary explanation of complexity, based on the simple co-occurrence 
of the two categories, fails to hold. More precisely, I shall seek to show how this 
dualistic vision (co-occurrence of the two features of complexity vs. prevalence of one 
of them) permeates Hayek’s work. In general, the criterion based on the (large or 
small) number of variables is a descriptive term - in the sense that it is the criterion that 
                                                
1 Some elements of Hayek’s theory of complexity were put forward in the 1940s and later 
converged (and were harmonized) with spontaneous orders theory. Caldwell (2001, p. 7) observes that 
some evolutionary themes appeared (relatively late) in The Constitution of Liberty (1960). 
2 I thank one of the referees for having suggested consideration of this topic. 
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Hayek adopts to distinguish between simple and complex phenomena (see Barry, 1979, 
p. 28) - while the nature of connections among the variables evokes a different 
dimension (definable as logical-relational) in some way able to explain how the 
properties of the whole arise. Hayek does not consider this distinction, because these 
categories are in most cases indisputably connected. This circumstance is somehow 
considered in contemporary theories of complexity which often stress the many 
interacting (heterogeneous) agents which constitute the basic conditions for complex 
problems. By contrast, Hayek’s idea that models of simple phenomena are always 
characterized by a small number of variables is dubious, given that large numbers of 
variables appear even in very elementary structures.3 In this sense, the paper examines 
the theoretical consequences of Hayek’s thesis, and specifically how the representation 
of complexity changes when he emphasizes one term more than the other. 
In what follows (section 1), I discuss how Hayek explains the role of the large 
number of variables and of the manners of their connection, when he treats the 
distinction between the physical and social (and biological) sciences, and between 
complex and simple phenomena. The former category describes complexity in terms of 
numerical, interrelated, events; the latter provides a view of complex phenomena in 
logical-relational terms, and it is evoked to explain the emergent properties of the 
whole. Despite the close relation between these concepts, the former essentially 
prevails over the latter, delineating the distinctive configuration of Hayek’s theory. 
Section 2 shows how the numerical concept of complexity induces Hayek to 
describe complex systems as if they were objective events, although his subjectivism 
indisputably distinguishes between external reality and its mental reconstruction. 
Sections 2.1 refers to Herbert A. Simon’s work and discusses how the level of analysis 
                                                
3 There is no agreement in contemporary studies on the notion of complexity (Horgan, 1997, p. 
303, footnote 11; Rosser, 1999). For example, Grobstein (1973) and Pattee (1973) focus on the nature 
of relationships among the components of a given level of a (complex) order, independently of their 
number. Similarly, Arthur does not mention the number of variables as a condition for modelling 
complexity, while he stresses the relational component: “Complex studies look at interacting 
elements producing aggregate patterns that those elements in turn react to. This seems to be the theme 
of all studies I’ve seen on complexity” (Arthur, 2005, pp. 20-21). Yet, following Holland (1988, p. 
117), Arthur, Durlauf and Lane (1997, p. 3) maintain: “What happens in the economy is determined 
4 
adopted is crucial for defining complexity, in that it determines what variables are 
relevant (and what number of them must be considered). In this perspective, the 
number of variables is one condition included in the model, but it does not constitute, 
as it does for Hayek, the primary basis on which to elaborate an explanation of 
complex phenomena. 
Section 3 treats the notion of “dispersed knowledge” (or more appropriately 
dispersed information) used to describe market complexity and which defines 
knowledge in quantitative and/or informational terms. This is an empirical variant of 
the numerical approach to complex phenomena, according to which the market is 
complex because the enormous amount of information possessed by individuals is 
fragmented. Yet this concept does not per se explain how dispersed information 
contributes to the emergence of a spontaneous order. It implies an empirical-descriptive 
level of analysis, while the self-organizing properties of the market involve a different, 
explanatory, category, and a different logical level of analysis. This latter perspective 
stresses that the market is not complex because of the dispersion of an infinite amount 
of information; rather, it is complex because it is a mechanism (a system of rules) able 
to propagate fragmented information, thus generating a spontaneous order. Its 
complexity therefore derives from this capacity. 
The case of “inarticulate knowledge” (dealt with in section  4) is very different. It 
is not measurable, nor does it involve a large amount of “particular facts” as  
“dispersed knowledge” does. It is a part of (and arises from) tacit mental processes 
involving schemes of thought (abstract rules) which guide our behaviour. The 
complexity of this knowledge does not depend on its size but instead derives from 
cognitive mechanisms which enable the use of unconscious capacities to discover new 
opportunities and obey abstract rules on which spontaneous order depends. 
Finally, section 5 shows how the same dualism is apparent when Hayek deals with 
“explanations of the principle”. On the one hand, these are viewed as the consequence 
of the impossibility of knowing an excessively large number of facts. On the other 
                                                                                                                                    
by the interaction of many dispersed, possibly heterogeneous, agents acting in parallel”. The latter 
point has also been emphasized by, among others, Markose (2005), and Foley (2003, p. 2). 
5 
hand, they are conceived as able to represent the changeable relations among the 
components of a (social, mental, or biological) structure from which emergent 
properties and complex phenomena arise in evolutionary terms. 
 
 
1. Hayek’s theory of complexity 
 
As is well-known, in Scientism (1942-1944) Hayek defines the method of social 
sciences in subjectivist terms: that is, he maintains that human action depends on the 
perception, interpretation, and classification of the external world. The social sciences 
must therefore start from this assumption, since “things are what the acting people 
think they are” (Hayek, (1979 [1942-1944], p. 44). This perspective delineates the 
difference between the approaches of the natural and social sciences, where the former 
is “objective” and the latter “subjective” (Hayek, (1979 [1942-1944], p. 46). This 
requires drawing a clear distinction between the (opposite) methods of the two kinds of 
science, showing the non-applicability of the tools of physics to the social sciences. 
The natural sciences adopt a deductive or “analytic” procedure whereby they move 
from wholes to their particular elements, while the social sciences (which treat 
“complex phenomena”) adopt a “compositive” method whereby the whole is 
reproduced and explained starting from its individual elements (Hayek, 1979 [1942-
1944], pp. 65-67); see Hayek, 1935a, pp. 126-127). 
Other differences become apparent on considering the aims of the natural and social 
scientist: the former (an “astronomer”) seeks to know “all the elements of which his 
universe is composed”, whereas the latter can only know “the types of elements” of his 
universe because he is faced by a too large “number of separate variables”. This 
requires the social sciences to use a distinctive form of knowledge: “knowledge of the 
principle” which generates social phenomena whose abstract nature does not permit 
prediction of the precise outcomes of social processes (Hayek, 1979 [1942-1944], pp. 
73-74).  
6 
In Degrees of Explanation (1955), Hayek provides further details on the differences 
between the natural sciences (specifically physics) and the social sciences with respect 
to their methods and objects. 
 
“More particularly, what we regard as the field of physics may well be totally of phenomena where 
the number of significantly connected variables of different kinds is sufficiently small to enable us to 
study them as if they formed a closed system for which we can observe and control all the determining 
factors” (1967 [1955], pp. 3-4; emphasis added; cf. p. 20) 
 
Physics, as a science which treats “relatively simple” phenomena, is concerned with 
“closed systems” whose “few connected events” allow their close control, whilst social 
systems are (implicitly) open systems comprising a large number of interrelated 
elements. These characteristics make it possible to distinguish between simple and 
complex phenomena. Sometimes not even physics is able to produce exact predictions 
owing to limitations in the precision of measurement. Biology is the discipline (among 
the natural sciences) which essentially resorts to “explanation of the principle” because 
the theory of evolution does not yield specific predictions but “can explain only kinds 
of phenomena, defined by very general characteristics” (Hayek, 1967 [1955], p. 13; cf. 
1967 [1964], p. 31). 4 
In The Theory of Complex Phenomena (1964) Hayek reiterates his conviction that 
the physical sciences treat “simple phenomena”, while social (biological and mind) 
theories deal with “complex phenomena”. Moreover, as in previous essays, he has 
complexity depend on the number of variables in the system. This is evident when one 
compares “inanimate” (i.e., physical) and “animate” worlds (including the social 
universe). The latter are more complex and “more highly organized”, and moving from 
one to another implies observation of an “increasing complexity” (Hayek, 1967 [1964], 
p. 26). In fact, Hayek later maintained, the difference between simple and complex 
phenomena “is certainly one of degree”, and he specified: “I think the essential point is 
                                                
4 Also cybernetics, theory of automata, general system theory, communication theory, and 
linguistics treat complex phenomena, and seem to rely on this explanatory method (Hayek, 1967 [1955], 
p. 20; 1967a, p. 72; 1979, pp. 158-159). 
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that degree of complexity of phenomena is measured by the number of variables that an 
explanatory theory must contain” (Hayek, 1982, p. 321; emphasis added). Therefore, 
assuming the criterion of the “number of distinct variables” in creating a model, “Non-
physical phenomena are more complex because we call physical what can be described 
by relatively simple formulae” (Hayek, 1967 [1964], p. 26)5. 
With respect to Degrees of Explanation, it is misleading to wonder whether 
structures are “open” or “closed”, since there are no closed systems in the universe; 
rather, the focus is on the large number of variables which should be included in 
models of complexity (Hayek, 1967 [1964], p. 27). In this regard, statistics cannot 
provide a solution for complexity problems because, although it treats large numbers, it 
eliminates complexity itself by dealing with “the individual elements which it counts as 
if they were not systematically connected” (Hayek, 1967 [1964], p. 29).6 Moreover, 
models of complexity must consider the change over time of interactions among a large 
number of variables when they belong to an evolutionary system. By contrast, models 
for simple systems treat a small number of connected variables, and their ability to 
provide exact predictions depends on whether they can measure and empirically control 
the data which specifically represent those variables. 
Finally, these opinions are summarized, once again, in The Pretence of Knowledge 
(1975), where Hayek maintains that  
1) the physical sciences, contrary to economics and other disciplines, do not treat 
complex phenomena (Hayek, 1978 [1975], p. 24). In particular, the physical 
sciences assume that “any important factor which determines the observed 
events will itself be directly observable and measurable”, whilst complex 
                                                
5 According to Caldwell, “a striking difference is evident” from Scientism to Degrees, since “the 
dividing line is not between the natural and social sciences, but between those that study relatively 
simple versus complex phenomena” (Caldwell, 2000, p. 11). Yet the basic criterion of “number of 
separate variables” by which to divide the two kinds of sciences, and their objects of analysis, permeates 
both the articles. 
6 Physics resorts to “statistics to deal with systems of very large numbers of variables” and 
statistical technique is “a manner of reducing the number of separate entities, connected by laws which 
have to be stated, to comparatively few […] and not a technique for dealing with the interplay of a large 
number of such significantly independent variables as the individuals in a social order.” (Hayek, 1967 
[1955], p. 3, note 1; emphasis added; cf. pp. 8-9). 
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phenomena like the market “will hardly ever be fully known or measurable” 
(Hayek, 1978 [1975], p. 24; emphasis added). 
2) the social sciences and biology deal with “structures of essential complexity” 
connoted by a “relatively large numbers of variables”. In particular, in the 
economic sphere, competition involves “a fairly large number of acting persons” 
(Hayek, 1978 [1975], p. 26). 
3) the social sciences deal with “phenomena of organized complexity”, that is, “the 
character of the structures showing it [the organized complexity] depends not 
only on the properties of the individual elements of which they are composed, 
and the relative frequency with which they occur, but also on the manner in 
which the individual elements are connected with each other” (Hayek, 1978 
[1975], pp. 26-27; emphasis added). 
The third point makes it possible to view “organized complexity” in terms of a 
whole, with its own properties. A complex structure, with reference to the mind, 
implies that “a particular order of events or objects is something different from all the 
individual events taken separately” (Hayek, 1976 [1952], p. 47), and its properties 
emerge from the peculiar connection of its individual parts. Therefore, the view 
according to which “An order involves elements plus certain relations between them” 
(Hayek, 1976 [1952], p. 47; can be assumed as a general perspective from which to 
define many complex structures, from the mind to the market.  
In short, Hayek defines complexity on the basis of two concepts – number of 
variables and the modes of their connection – which perform different roles. A third 
characteristic – which is not specifically mentioned by Hayek in his methodological 
essays but is widely present in his work as a whole – should be considered: the 
heterogeneity of agents, who exhibit different histories, behaviours, cognitive processes 
and knowledge (see sections 3 and 4). This is an important feature when the complex 
phenomenon is society and its constituents are individuals. By contrast, it is a less 
obvious concept when Hayek relates complexity to other fields, for example biological 
systems, whose members are living beings which do not possess those human 
characteristics (see note 4 and section 5). Then, if we consider cybernetics, mind, 
9 
automata, and communication theories, which Hayek alludes to as examples of 
complexity theories, the notion of the heterogeneity of individual constituents is more 
problematic. I therefore consider only the number of variables and their relations as the 
more general terms which explicitly connote Hayek’s view of complexity. The former 
is a condition for the model to which correspond potentially “observable and 
measurable” events which characterize complex phenomena in the external world 
(notwithstanding the great difficulty of knowing them in their entirety), whilst the latter 
is an explanatory (logical-relational) category. Yet, in this context, the Hayekian 
logical-relational term is somewhat theoretically weak. In fact, its distinctive feature 
(the connection among variables) is a characteristic shared by both simple and 
complex phenomena, whereas the former are connoted by small number, and the latter 
are defined by a large number of interrelated variables, and the move from the one to 
the other is only matter of degree (Hayek, 1982, p. 321). Therefore, the numerical 
approach prevails over the logical-relational one in defining complexity. Moreover, in 
general, a small number of facts permit the observability, measurability, 
manipulability, and predictability of (future) sets of connected events, which for these 
reasons are simple. The reverse outcomes connote large number of related events, 
which consequently determine the nature of complexity. Nonetheless the logical-
relational perspective, which points out what principles explain the emergence of 
organized structures, is present in Hayek’s discourse (Hayek, 1973, p. 38). 
Using Hayek’s vocabulary, it seems that emergent properties, which, for example, 
connote elementary living systems, can be explained by showing how “the individual 
elements are connected with each other”, whilst their number does not say much about 
the functioning of those systems. Yet proceeding from inanimate to animate and social 
phenomena, from low to high levels of complexity,7 implies conceiving complexity 
predominantly as a matter of degree – as Hayek himself maintained. If this is so, then 
phenomena considered between those opposite extremes exhibit the same, qualitative, 
nature, since there is a fundamental continuity among them, whilst their difference is 
                                                
7 Assuming, of course, the criterion of “the minimum number of distinct variables a formula or 
model must possess in order to reproduce” complexity (Hayek, 1967 [1964], p. 26). 
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specified only in quantitative terms. By contrast, the emphasis on changeable 
connections among elements gives rise to a different (logical) category able to show, in 
intuitive terms, the emergent properties of living and social systems, as well as their 
discontinuity with respect to the inanimate (relatively uncomplex) world (see Parisi, 
1992, pp. 256-257). From this perspective, the explanation of complexity and its 
properties focuses more on the network of relations among variables than on their 
number, where this latter is only one condition for the model.8  
In The Pretence of Knowledge, Hayek refers to Warren Weaver’s opposition 
between “phenomena of unorganized complexity” (limited to “some fields” of physics) 
and the “phenomena of organized complexity” (Hayek, 1978 [1975], p. 26) dealt with 
by the social sciences. “Complexity” characterizes both situations, so that the task of 
science seems to be explaining the organization, that is, understanding why some 
complex phenomena are organized but others are not. This requires furnishing a 
logical category able to explain the discontinuity between non-organization and 
organization. More precisely, Hayek admits that there are two kinds of complexity: 
“organized” and “unorganized”, so that the problem is not the number of variables 
(which is indefinite in both situations) but rather discovering the reasons that induce 
certain types of complexity to become “organized”.9 But then, a few pages later, he 
states: “A theory of essentially complex phenomena must refer to a large number of 
particular facts” (Hayek, 1978 [1975], p. 32), thereby reintroducing the distinction 
between the opposite couples of simple events/few variables, and complexity/large 
number of variables. 
In conclusion, Hayek examines neither the theoretical differences between the two 
categories that he uses to define complexity (number of variables and the modes of 
                                                
8 Vaughn observes that Hayek’s focus on the number of variables does not describe the 
characteristics of modern complex systems, although he captures them by introducing the non-
linearity of elements, and their path-dependent interaction (Vaughn, 1999, p. 249; cf. Gaus 2007). 
Although this is correct, the number of variables nonetheless is an essential part of Hayek’s definition 
of complex phenomena, and it determines his approach to the problem. 
9 On the other hand, Weaver (1948, p. 538) points out that problems of “disorganized 
complexity” (similarly to those of “organized complexity”) involve a very large number of variables. 
Therefore they do not coincide with those implied in Hayek’s models for simple phenomena, which 
are connoted by small numbers of variables. 
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their relations) – which are constantly connected in his work – nor, evidently, the 
consequences of their distinction. He therefore essentially describes complex and non-
complex phenomena in sharp, dichotomic, terms and specifies which disciplines and 
methods deal with them, as listed below:  
 
 
COMPLEX PHENOMENA 
- Social science, evolutionary biology (and 
cybernetic, mind, automata, general system, 
and communication theories)  
- “compositive” (“synthetic”) method 
- large number of connected variables 
- non-measurable variables 
- types of relations among variables which 
produce complexity 
- explanations of the principle 
(unpredictability) 
- agents’ heterogeneity (social order) 
 
NON-COMPLEX PHENOMENA 
- Physics (and statistics)  
 
 
- deductive (“analytic”) method 
- small number of connected variables 
- measurable variables 
- types of relations among variables which do 
not produce complexity 
- exact prediction of particular events 
(predictability) 
 
 
 
 
2. Complexity and number of variables: objective and subjective 
representations 
 
Hayek’s emphasis on the role of a large number of connected variables induces a 
description of complex systems as if they were objective events (i.e., as if they were 
describable in purely objective terms). In the simple world delineated by physics, facts 
are “observable and measurable”, whilst in the universe represented by evolutionary 
biology and by the social sciences they are not, because they are “too numerous”. That 
is to say, they objectively exist as “particular facts” but cannot be fully observed over 
time by scholars, with the consequence that the latter are forced to consider “types of 
elements” (Hayek, 1973, pp. 23-24). 
12 
This account should be considered in connection with Hayek’s subjectivism. In fact, 
what appears as an objective event is the result of a subjective reconstruction of the 
whole which at a different level is also accomplished by theories (Hayek, 1979 [1942-
1944], pp. 82-83; see Weimer, 1982, p. 250): individuals select large numbers of 
objects as components of the same class of events, and this selection derives from their 
subjective classification of the external world (Hayek, 1979 [1942-1944], p. 80). 10  
However, the perception of a huge number of related events, to which correspond a 
huge number of data, seems to produce a perception of the environment as complex. 
For example, this view implicitly appears in Hayek’s contributions to the socialist 
calculation debate, where he points out the planner’s difficulty in processing (and 
knowing) the infinite number of data (the “amount of concrete information”) dispersed 
in the economic system (Hayek, 1935b, pp. 153-154). This is a problem described in 
terms of objective complexity, although the latter was probably not conceived in 
subjective terms in 1935, because Hayek elaborated his mature view on subjectivism 
only later (Caldwell, 2003, pp. 216-217). In short, it seems that the planner’s difficulty 
would be shared (and perceived) in a similar way by any other person in the same 
position, individual differences notwithstanding. As a consequence, the numerical 
criterion, so to speak, seems to be a suitable instrument with which to define (and 
perceive) complexity. However, the matter is not so straightforward if one re-analyzes 
it considering what Hayek defines as simple events, as opposed to complex ones. 
Simon’s perspective sheds light on these matters. 
 
2.1 Simon: complexity, levels of analysis, and bounded rationality 
 
According to Simon, external complexity influences the individual’s “internal 
representation” of the environment; and when this latter is coupled with a problem or 
                                                
10 This account has been viewed as problematic. For example, according to Lawson, especially 
in Scientism, Hayek “does not so much escape the characteristic errors of positivism as reproduce 
them in a subjectivist form”, and in general “he fails in formulating his subjectivist alternative to 
transcend many of the errors of positivism […] That is, in parallel with the positivist reduction of 
physical reality to experience, Hayek succeeds only in reducing human society to conceptions” 
(Lawson, 1997, pp. 145 and 150). 
13 
goal, a “task environment” arises (Newell and Simon, 1972; 1981). Complexity exists 
in the objective world, and it stimulates adaptive responses by computationally limited 
beings: the ant’s irregular path is due to the complexity of the surface of the beach, to 
which it adapts its behaviour, given its limited (rational) capacities, although for a 
human observer more linear behaviours are possible (Simon, 1996 [1969], pp. 51-53). 
This perspective is generalized to humans11 and shows that very simple situations can 
be perceived as complex if agents’ computational systems do not permit mastery of 
them (as happens to the ant). Hence, the large (or small) number of real data – in 
absolute terms – is not per se a fundamental argument for defining complexity (or its 
absence). Rather, rationally limited individuals, starting from their internal 
representation of the environment, cope with a problem by adopting simplifying 
strategies (heuristic processes) for its solution (where the number of variables treated 
depend on the particular circumstances of that context). 
As a consequence, events that Hayek qualifies as simple (like organizations12, 
“small groups of primitive society”13, or an imaginary planning, whose conditions were 
“so simple that a single person or board could effectively survey all the relevant facts” 
(Hayek, 1997 [1944], p. 36))14 can be viewed as complex for Simon’s agents. In 
particular, according to Simon, and contrary to Hayek, organizations exhibit high levels 
of complexity which cannot normally be mastered by the organizer’s bounded 
rationality, since, within organizations, “the ‘real’ situation is almost always far too 
complex to be handled in detail” (March and Simon 1993 [1958], p. 171).  
                                                
11 “The apparent complexity of behavior[s] [by ants and men] over time is largely a reflection 
of the complexity of the environment in which [they] they find [themselves]” (Simon, 1996 [1969], 
pp. 52-53).  
12 If the “limited resources” of an organization are known to the organizer, they can be 
managed, and organization is not a complex system (Hayek, 1978 [1968a], p. 76). 
13 In these societies “the concrete events which individuals encounter in their daily pursuits 
will be very much the same for all, and they will act together because the events they know and the 
objectives at which they aim are more or less the same”. This situation is to the reverse of the 
complexity of Great Society, “where millions of men interact” (Hayek, 1973, p. 14). Once again, 
large and small numbers matter in defining complex and simple systems. 
14 Therefore, small numbers of variables define simple circumstances, while large numbers 
define complex ones. In fact, Hayek immediately specifies: “It is only as the factors which have to be 
taken into account become so numerous that is impossible to gain a synoptic view of them” (Hayek, 
1997 [1944], p. 36). 
14 
Simon points out another crucial element, this one linked to his Kantian opinion 
that the external world cannot be known in itself but only internally represented15: 
“How complex or simple a structure is depends critically upon the way we describe it” 
(Simon, 1962, p. 481). As a consequence, a description (or model) of complexity 
depends on the level of analysis adopted, and this determines the number of variables 
considered. If this level changes, so too do the variables included in the model, and 
their (large or small) number reflects this circumstance. Moreover, many levels of 
analysis and their reciprocal interactions must be evaluated in many circumstances, so 
that the number of variables may be very large. Yet this is not a barrier against an 
inquiry into complexity. The argument of interrelations among different levels of 
analysis leads to the core of Simon’s theory of complexity, which is based on the 
notions of “hierarchy” and “near decomposability”. 
 
“By a hierarchic system, or hierarchy, I mean a system that is composed of interrelated subsystems, 
each of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary 
subsystem. In most systems in nature, it is somewhat arbitrary as to where we leave off the partitioning, 
and what subsystems we take as elementary.” (Simon, 1962, p. 468) 
 
In short, the level of analysis decides what an “elementary subsystem” is (and what 
variables are included in the model representing it), and this is “somewhat arbitrary”. 
Consideration of the number of variables, in absolute terms, is not the correct approach, 
because it may generate an infinite regression as the search for the most elementary 
structure proceeds; whereas, I repeat, whether a phenomenon is complex or simple 
(elementary) depends on the unit of analysis.16 In fact, Simon maintains, some decades 
ago atoms 
 
                                                
15 See Newell and Simon (1972, pp. 56 and 824). 
16 “Scientific knowledge is organized in levels, not because reduction in principle is 
impossible, but because nature is organized in levels, and the pattern of each level is most clearly 
discerned by abstracting from the detail of the levels far below” (Simon, 1977, pp. 260-261; emphasis 
added). 
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“were elementary particles; today, to the nuclear physicist, they are complex systems. For certain 
purposes of astronomy, whole stars, or even galaxies, can be regarded as elementary subsystems. In one 
kind of biological research, a cell may be treated as an elementary subsystem; in another, a protein 
molecule; in still another, an amino acid residue.” (Simon, 1962, p. 468) 
 
The level of analysis matters when one observes the relation between subsystems 
and the aggregate. The near decomposability of hierarchic systems implies the 
distinction “between the interactions among subsystems, on the one hand, and the 
interactions within subsystems – i.e., among the parts of those subsystems – on the 
other” (Simon, 1962, p. 473). This means that nearly decomposable structures are 
characterized by “interactions among the subsystems [which] are weak, but not 
negligible”, and in the short run the behaviour of each element in a system is 
approximately independent, while in the long run it depends in “an aggregate way” on 
the behaviour of the other components (Simon, 1962, p. 474).17 
Once again, the unit of analysis adopted is fundamental with respect to the number 
of variables included in the model, which change according to whether the focus is on 
interaction among or within subsystems.18 
Summarizing, for Hayek the number of variables seems to be largely classified by 
individuals (and scientists) in the same way, in the sense that in general terms their 
perception of reality is sufficiently homogeneous, although “the knowledge and beliefs 
of different people” can be “different and often conflicting in many respects” (Hayek, 
1979 [1942-1944], pp. 49-50; cf. p. 80). On the other hand, cultural selection processes 
enable individuals to share general rules of conduct which refer to similar “schemata of 
                                                
17 These characteristics are illustrated by the example of a building with thermal insulation 
against the external environment. The building is divided into a certain number of rooms (the 
subsystems), the walls of which constitute the boundaries of the main subsystems, and in turn each 
room is divided into cubicles with poor insulation. The initial, wide, thermal difference among the 
cubicles, and from room to room will gradually disappear; in particular it will be reduced first among 
the cubicles, and subsequently among rooms (Simon, 1962, p. 474). 
18 Note that, Simon, when discussing the role of levels of analysis, observes that the 
interrelated subsystems are “intermediate stable forms” which strongly influence the evolution of 
complex aggregates, since they act as building blocks for further construction (Simon, 1962; 2000). 
Both Holland (1988, p. 118) and Arthur, Durlauf and Lane (1997, p. 4), using the same words, accept 
these ideas as indicating one feature of complex systems: “The economy has many levels of 
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thought”; it is consequently likely that they elaborate shared representations of (social) 
reality (see Caldwell, 2003, p. 286). It is therefore unsurprising that large numbers of 
related events are codified as complex phenomena, whilst small numbers of 
(connected) particular facts assume the form of simple, tractable, phenomena. But in 
Simon’s perspective this view cannot be held, because complexity cannot be treated by 
assuming Hayek’s large/small number of variables dichotomy as the reference point, 
since the number of variables matters in relation to the unit of analysis adopted. 
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that Hayek’s view on the role of number of 
variables essentially refers to the impossibility of observing, measuring, controlling, 
and exactly predicting a given phenomenon. This impossibility derives from “our 
irremediable ignorance of most of the particular facts which determine the process of 
society” (Hayek, 1973, p. 13). Therefore, the question is not determining what 
mathematical formulation better represents Hayek’s notion of “large number of 
variables” (for example, combinatorial explosion, or other more or less refined tools). 
Rather, this notion highlights two limitations: informational and computational. The 
former implies that we cannot know all the facts. The latter emphasises that the human 
mind is able to control and manipulate only a few variables, and owing to this 
boundedness some complex problems are intractable (see section 3).  
In addition, it should be pointed out that biologists and physicists are familiar with 
the idea of levels of analysis (Grobstein, 1973; Maturana and Varela, 1980, p. xxii; 
Auyang, 1998): classical mechanics is unsuitable for dealing with very small systems 
like atoms, and for this task it is replaced by quantum mechanics. This perspective 
leads to a traditional argument of theories of complexity, namely the emergence of 
collective behaviours which cannot be understood merely by referring to the properties 
of individual elements in complex systems.19 Hence a given set of related components 
is definable as a “level of order” “because it has unitary properties at that level” which 
stem from the particular relationships among them (Grobstein, 1973, p. 32; see Ruelle, 
                                                                                                                                    
organization and interaction” and “Units at any given levels” “typically serve as ‘building blocks’ for 
constructing units at the next higher level”. 
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1991, ch. 15). Pattee, as a physicist interested in the origin of life, endorses the view of 
complexity with reference to hierarchical structures and delineates the notion of a 
“control hierarchy” by means of which “the upper level [of a collection of subunits] 
exerts a specific, dynamic constraint on the details of the motion at lower level [i.e., 
selected individual subunits]” (Pattee, 1973, p. 77). The forces of constraint are thus 
associated with a (new) “hierarchical level of description” (p. 85), and this implies a 
“selective neglect of detail in favor of only a very limited number of crucial 
conditions” (p. 90). Parisi (1992) shows that an intermediate point of view between 
reductionist and global perspectives is possible: the starting point is the behaviour of 
individual components, yet it must also be considered that macroscopic behaviour does 
not change if there are small changes in the laws regulating the behaviours of 
individual elements. Therefore to be stressed is a certain independence and diversity of 
macro-systems with respect to micro-phenomena,20 and this, as for Pattee’s theory, 
calls to mind the near independence of Simon’s nearly decomposable structures. 
 
 
3. Complexity, “dispersed knowledge”, and bounded rationality 
 
The problem of knowledge in Hayek’s work is one of the most widely debated 
themes in the literature, and a correlated argument is Hayek’s unclear distinction 
between knowledge and information. In general, knowledge implies the capacity to 
process information, to apply abstract schemes, to solve problems, and to discover 
opportunities, whilst information refers to measurable data which must be mastered and 
organized by implicit or explicit knowledge (i.e. tacit or theoretical knowledge) (Fiori, 
1998; Khalil, 2002). Moreover, knowledge “cannot simply be subsumed within 
‘information’ as conceptualized in the economics of information literature” (Böhm, 
1994, p. 160; cf. Butos and McQuade, 2002, p. 124), since, among other things, it is 
                                                                                                                                    
19 New qualities, unknown at microscopic level, appear at the macroscopic one, like 
temperature and gas pressure. Similarly, it cannot be determined whether a few molecules of water 
constitute a liquid or a solid state. Cf. Markose (2005, p. 165). 
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“embodied in skills and habits […] which are rarely expressible in theoretical or 
technical terms” (Gray, 1984, p. 37; see Lavoie, 1986). 
In light of these problems, this section and the next treat the notions of “dispersed” 
and “inarticulate” knowledge in order to show how numerical and logical-relational 
approaches involve the view of knowledge and information in Hayek’s work. 
“Dispersed knowledge” (or the “fragmentation of knowledge”) constitutes a 
fundamental Hayekian concept in favour of the market system, in that the latter is a 
mechanism able to provide individuals with useful, “relevant”, knowledge and enable 
them to discover such knowledge by means of the competition process (Hayek, 1973, 
p. 14, cf. Hayek, 1978 [1968b], p. 179; cf. Kirzner, 1992 [1984], p. 154). Yet, the 
notion of “dispersed knowledge” defines knowledge in quantitative and/or explicit 
terms as a set of data or information about “particular facts”: people do not know “all 
the data which enter into the social order”, and each person possesses only a “small 
fraction” of the whole of information present in society (Hayek, 1973, p. 15; emphasis 
added). Therefore, this notion could be more precisely classified as dispersed 
information because it refers, in general, to measurable data and/or observable events. 
For example, measurable data concern (local) information about the (changeable) need 
for production factors, goods and services (Hayek, 1945, p. 83), while an observable 
event can be an item of (local) information which has an explicit form for someone 
(although, stricto sensu, not necessarily measurable), such as “To know of and put to 
use a machine not fully employed, or somebody’s skill which could be better utilized” 
(Hayek, 1945, p. 80). In this sense, information of this kind is quantitative and/or 
explicit. In conclusion, “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” 
consists in “unique information” possessed by each individual (Hayek, 1945, p. 80), 
and the difficulty of measuring and observing these circumstances depends on its 
spatial dispersion, and on the “continuous flow” characterizing the number of elements 
that agents must consider.  
                                                                                                                                    
20 This hypothesis has been suggested by professor XXX, whom I thank, in a personal 
communication. 
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“Dispersed knowledge” is clearly linked to the concept of the large number of 
variables as the basic characteristic of complex phenomena. The crucial point is that 
these data (which take the form of local information) are not present all together to the 
actor, because they are dispersed in space and change at any point of time (Hayek, 
1945, pp. 81-83). This framework involves a peculiar concept of bounded rationality 
because the notion of the “unavoidable imperfection of man’s knowledge” (Hayek, 
1945, p. 91) joins two separate concepts. The first is an informational limit of 
individuals, who are unable to know all the knowledge (information) dispersed in 
society. This limitation depends on the structures of the social environment. The 
second concept is the internal limitedness of the mind in processing a large amount of 
information (in general, all the information involved in complex phenomena). The 
former indicates that each agent possesses only limited information; the latter refers to 
individuals’ cognitive and computational bounds. 
This distinction appears in Simon’s thought, although its characteristics are different 
with respect to Hayek’s. On Simon’s view, informational bounds are scarcely specified 
and involve the general relation between agents and the environment. By contrast, in 
Hayek’s view on the informational limit is specified, in the sense that it appears when 
individuals do not possess certain information because of its spatial fragmentation. This 
perspective can be generalized if one considers that a similar lack of information also 
connotes social scientists and biologists, who cannot know all the elements (and their 
correlated properties) which constitute the object of their analysis, and this induces 
them to adopt the “explanation of the principle” (Hayek, 1979 [1942-1944], p. 73).21 
Whilst on Simon’s view computational limits occur when too much information 
available at the same time cannot be fully processed by agents (who consequently 
adopt heuristic procedures for handling problems),22 for Hayek they essentially appear 
in one extreme case, that is, when an agent (usually a planner) is unable to deal with all 
                                                
21 Moreover, the flux of time causes a further loss of information about a number of events 
involved in evolutionary processes in both biology and social sciences. 
22 See Simon (1997 [1947], pp. 124 and 226). According to Simon, on the one hand, available 
information can be excessive, and he raises the problem of its cognitive processing. On the other, 
information is searched for by individuals when, in their problem-solving activities, they seek to 
achieve their goals through heuristic procedures. 
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the data (and not some of them) of an economic system. In this case, individuals’ 
(planners’) problems are “undecidable”, not because no answer can be provided in a 
finite time (Foley, 1998, p. 46), but because, as matter of fact, nobody can collect all 
the information dispersed in society.23 On the other hand, in the market environment, 
the market itself resolves computational problems of individuals because it enables 
them to obtain the proper amount of “relevant” and tractable information by means of 
discovery procedures. 
In short, Hayek stresses the informational limits of the mind (rationality), which 
depend on the real structure of the social environment, while internal cognitive bounds 
(computational limits) have a less clear function in that they either appear prevalently 
in one extreme (unreal) case or can be resolved with help of market processes. As a 
consequence, Hayek seemingly does not analyze intermediate cases, i.e. individuals 
unable to process too much information – not all information – available to them at the 
same time, whilst he shows how new, relevant, knowledge can be obtained by means of 
discovery procedures. In fact, when the real environment is not complex (see section 
2), information can easily be manipulated and organized for specific ends; otherwise it 
is better to leave the diffusion of information to the market mechanism. 
In conclusion, on linking the “theory of complex phenomena” and the concept of 
“dispersed knowledge” it emerges that: 
1) a large number of correlated variables is a condition for defining complexity; 
2) these variables (which are specific “facts” in the real world and assume the 
form of information for individuals) exhibit spatial dispersion, and they 
change very rapidly over time. Hence, the corresponding information is a flux, 
rather than a set of fixed data (Hayek, 1945, pp. 81-83); 
3) dispersed information affects the scientific explanation of social and 
evolutionary, biological, events, because we can produce only “explanations 
                                                
23 As regards the subject studied by social scientists, Hayek maintains that the “number of 
separate variables” (i.e. the whole number of events) which determine a change is “too large” and 
consequently cannot be mastered and processed (Hayek, (1979 [1942-1944], p. 73). More in general, 
social scientists and biologists can never know all the particulars of evolutionary processes. See 
section 5. 
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of the principle”, given the impossibility of knowing the “very large number 
of particular facts” (Hayek, 1973, p. 23; cf. 1979 [1942-1944], pp. 73-74). 
However, there is a further condition specifying the market as a complex 
phenomenon: its structure depends on informational relations among agents (the 
connections among individual parts qualify a complex order, organize it, and define 
its emergent properties). Therefore, both the abstract approach to complex 
phenomena, and the treatment of knowledge in the market, mix two different 
categories: the spatial dispersion of a huge amount of information does not per se 
explain the self-organizing and self-reproducing properties of a system, whereas the 
latter can be explained if we consider the distinctive connections among the 
system’s components. This finding is confirmed by analysis of the notion of cultural 
evolution and of “inarticulate knowledge”.  
 
 
4. Complexity, evolution, and “inarticulate knowledge” 
 
The theory of cultural selection is a fundamental component of Hayek’s approach to 
complexity, in that evolutionary systems (like the market) are complex systems. The 
argument that Hayek puts forward is that certain rules and practices spontaneously 
emerged, and were unintentionally selected over others, because they gave 
(reproductive) advantages to the group which adopted them (Hayek, 1973, p. 17). 
In Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct (1967), Hayek maintains 
that “selection of rules will operate on the basis of the greater or lesser efficiency of the 
resulting order of the group” (Hayek, 1967a, p. 67, cf. Hayek, 1973, p. 17). The 
“important point” is that the general character of the “resulting order” is “the regularity 
of the conduct of the elements” (Hayek, 1973, p. 40). As a consequence, the order of 
actions is a basic emergent property which also appears in the formation of “correct 
expectations” (Hayek, 1973, p. 36), where evidently incorrect expectations would 
impede agents’ coordination. All this is coherent with the concept of the “phenomena 
of organized complexity”, where these latter crucially depend on the distinctive manner 
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in which the interactions among individuals are fulfilled (Hayek, 1978 [1975], pp. 26-
27), since selected rules determine, in general terms, how individuals give shape to 
their reciprocal relations, and consequently to the social and economic order. Yet this 
argument is logically distinct from the one which relates complexity to the large 
number of variables, and once again it suggests that complexity can emerge from 
certain connections among variables, the number of which depends on the unit of 
analysis adopted.24 
However, in Hayek’s intention, the evolution of rules does not contradict his 
individualistic approach, specifically in economic theory, because the system of rules 
as a “whole” must be “interpreted as nothing else but an endeavour to reconstruct from 
regularities of the individual actions the character of the resulting order” (Hayek, 
1967a, p. 72).25 However, abstract rules enter into individuals’ lives in terms of tacit, 
non-verbalized, knowledge to which agents refer in their behaviours and decision-
making processes. In this sense, the case of the knowledge embodied in general, 
abstract, “rules of conduct” (“inarticulate knowledge”) is very different from that of 
“dispersed knowledge”.  
Inarticulate knowledge is not measurable because it does not concern a large amount 
of “particular facts” dispersed in space. Rather, it defines tacit, cognitive, processes 
which refer to “schemata of thought which guide us” (Hayek, 1973, p. 31). It “can be 
described in terms of [unconscious] rules” which “govern the actions of the individuals 
[…] without being known to the acting person in articulated (‘verbalized’ or explicit) 
form” (Hayek, 1973, pp. 18-19), and these characteristics render it neither measurable 
nor communicable. 
                                                
24 “Very complex orders” comprise “more particular facts than any brain could ascertain or 
manipulate”, yet they are explained referring to those “forces inducing the formation of spontaneous 
order” (Hayek, 1973, p. 38). 
25 The relation between individuals and order is described in terms of “integration” and 
interaction between “two different levels”, individual and social, since individuals are themselves 
“complex systems” (the brain and society are “polycentric”, spontaneous, orders (Hayek, 1967a, pp. 
73 and 76; 1976, p. 15)). Therefore, agents are integrated in (and are influenced by) a larger complex 
system to whose creation they have contributed (Hayek, 1967a, pp. 76-77; see Lange-von Kulessa, 
1997, p. 278). Yet this conclusion is problematic if one considers the well-known controversy on the 
potential contradiction between Hayek’s notions of subjectivism and cultural selection. On this 
debate, and for references, see Hodgson (1993) and Caldwell (2000). 
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The two kinds of knowledge therefore imply different concepts. Dispersed 
knowledge (information) refers to well-defined circumstances or facts; it is individual 
in nature and may be non-shared with others. “Inarticulate knowledge” implies a 
cognitive process which unconsciously guides behaviours, is shared by people in that it 
is embodied in general “rules of conduct”, helps coordination among individuals’ plans 
and actions, and allows the exploitation of environmental (market) knowledge, the 
discovery of opportunities, and the creation of a shared framework in which subjects 
interact. Moreover, it is not “factual knowledge” (information), but rather an abstract 
capacity of the mind which operates by means of rules of a special kind. Hayek tends to 
mix the two notions, because the cultural selection of rules explains the emergence of 
the spontaneous market order, and inarticulate knowledge, incorporated in abstract 
rules, enables an individual to discover the dispersed information possessed by others. 
Finally, inarticulate (tacit) knowledge produces individual skills and is therefore as 
fragmented as dispersed knowledge. Nonetheless this fragmentation does not explain 
its properties. 
The theoretical distinction between the two forms of knowledge is important 
because it provides new elements with which to interpret complexity. In fact, 
inarticulate knowledge is closely related to spontaneous orders, in that it is a by-
product of the set of evolving rules that has unintentionally taken shape over time. This 
framework shows the application of the general theory of complexity to the market, 
since these rules connote the market and the social order (i.e. complex phenomena) in 
terms of specific relations among individuals (i.e. connections among separate parts) 
(Hayek, 1973, p. 36). Yet, this perspective does not necessarily imply that spontaneous 
orders arise in relation to large number of variables. As Hayek himself maintains 
“Spontaneous orders are not necessarily complex” (Hayek, 1973, p. 38), as shown, for 
example, by the systems of rules regulating primitive, small, groups (as simple 
phenomena) and which have emerged spontaneously, and unintentionally, via the same 
processes which connote the emergence of rules in the complex “Great Society” order. 
Yet, when Hayek deals with “very complex orders”, he views the two conditions 
(number of variables and connections among components) as co-essential in any 
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circumstance (Hayek, 1973, pp. 36 and 38). Thus “dispersed knowledge” is treated 
jointly with “inarticulate knowledge”, and it seems to reflect the (logically separable) 
part of Hayek’s theory of complex phenomena which refers to “large number of 
variables” as a basic explanatory concept.  
 
 
5. The “Explanations of the principle” and the “Compositive method” 
 
The criterion of the “large number of variables” is evoked, as we have seen, in order 
to introduce the notion of the “explanations of the principle”. This latter is correlated in 
Scientism to the “compositive method” (see section 1) which, according to Hayek, must 
be used in the social sciences, in that “concepts and views” of individuals “form the 
elements from which we build up, as it were, the more complex phenomena” (Hayek, 
1979 [1942-1944], p. 65). Explanation of the principle (here “knowledge of the 
principle”) arises in the place of knowledge about all the details of complex phenomena 
because the social scientist  
 
“will scarcely ever know even all of the elements of which [his field of research] consists and he will 
certainly never know all the relevant properties of each of them […] The number of separate variables 
which in any particular social phenomenon will determine the result of a given change will as a rule be 
far too large for any human mind to master and manipulate them effectively.” (Hayek, 1979 [1942-
1944], p. 73; emphasis added). 
 
The first sentence stresses the insurmountable lack of information: social scientists 
never know all the elements (and related properties) which they study. The second one 
points out their cognitive and computational limits: the human mind cannot master too 
large a number of variables (see section 3). Hence, the “explanation of principles” 
arises from the connection of two distinct problems. Yet the “explanation of the 
principle”, in this form, points up an informational, quantitative, problem which 
persists in Hayek’s mature work. The premise is that, as regards “very complex 
phenomena”, the powers of science are “limited by the practical impossibility of 
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ascertaining all the particular facts”; therefore “science consists not of the knowledge 
of particular facts” (Hayek, 1973, p. 15). The problem delineated is a lack of 
information, which is shared by diverse disciplines, from social sciences to biology. 
Thus, on discussing of the theory of evolution in order to show its applicability to 
social and market spontaneous orders, Hayek maintains: 
 
“The theory of evolution proper provides no more than an account of a process the outcome of which 
will depend on a very large number of particular facts, far too numerous for us to know in their entirety, 
and therefore does not lead to predictions about the future. We are in consequence confined to 
‘explanations of the principle’ or to predictions merely of the abstract pattern the process will follow.” 
(Hayek, 1973, pp. 23-24; emphasis added) 
 
Therefore, the informational limit (the huge and unobservable number of facts) 
connotes the explanations of the principle, and the need to overcome requires analysis 
of “particular facts” to be replaced with that of “types of elements”. However, on 
reasoning counterfactually, one may pose the following question: if all the specific 
facts involved in complex social and biological phenomena were known by scientists, 
would the resulting explanation (or reconstruction by means of details) be just as good 
as the “explanation of the principle”? Hayek’s answer is “yes”. More precisely, it 
would be better because it allows exact predictions to be made, whereas “explanation 
of the principle” is a second-best solution26 and cannot be falsified (Hayek, 1967 [1964] 
p. 29). In other words, if a complete description were possible, complexity would 
disappear, because its fundamental feature  – the presence of a large number of 
unknown facts – would also disappear. Therefore, “explanation of the principle” 
(described in these terms) appears to be more a limited device, derived from a lack of 
observational and computational capacities, than an alternative instrument able to 
                                                
26 “Of course, compared with the precise predictions we have learnt to expect in the physical 
sciences, this sort of mere pattern predictions is a second best with which one does not like to have to 
be content.”  (Hayek, 1978 [1975], p. 33; emphasis added). Therefore, Ebenstein (2003, p. 173) 
maintains “Hayek embraced prediction as the criterion for scientific theories”. 
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provide a better explanation of complex phenomena27 on the basis of a logical 
dimension different from the analysis of details.28 
In my view, this is a consequence of that part of Hayek’s theory which defines 
complexity in informational (and quantitative) terms. This approach does not envisage 
the reconstruction of complex events by collecting particular facts (on the basis of a 
specific theory) or reconstructions by means of “principles” as explanations alternative 
in their nature. It does not connect the different levels of analysis of both types of 
reconstructions to different operational and explanatory dimensions.29 On the other 
hand, when, in The Theory of Complex Phenomena, Hayek defined the movement from 
“inanimate” to “animate” worlds as a matter of degree, measurable in terms of the 
increasing number of variables included in a model, he evoked the same logical 
perspective – that of continuity between those universes – instead of showing both their 
discontinuity and the discontinuity of the theoretical approaches required to explain 
inorganic and living worlds. From this point of view, the approach based on levels of 
analysis focuses on a perspective different from the one based on continuity among low 
and high degrees of complexity, where large-scale problems seem to be  amplified 
versions of small-scale ones. 
Yet there is another side to Hayek’s thought which describes complexity in terms of 
connections among individual parts by means of which organized structures and 
emergent properties appear as wholes. This view focuses on the changeable network of 
relations from which the properties of systems (spontaneous orders) emerge. It does not 
                                                
27 Hayek himself points out that analysis of the principles and of details are not alternative 
tools. In fact, “[I]t should perhaps be stressed that there can never be competition between the two 
procedures, because what we have called an explanation of the principle will always give us only part 
of the information which a full explanation would yield where it can be achieved, and because in this 
sense the former is a less powerful instrument.” (Hayek, 1967 [1955], p. 21; emphasis added). 
28 It should be borne in mind that, for Hayek, “facts” are only the events that sciences classify 
as such, and this is coherent with both his endorsement of Popper’s criticism of inductive 
generalizations (Hayek, 1967 [1955], p. 4), and his view of “The place of theory in historical 
knowledge […] in forming or constructing the whole to which history refers” (Hayek, 1979 [1942-
1944], p. 125). Therefore, evaluation of details is included in the theory which considers an analytical 
reconstruction of facts to be a substitute for the one based on “types of elements”. 
29 Hence, “reductionism” is not rejected as an ill-suited level of analysis, but rather because of 
the impossibility of providing “an exhaustive enumeration of all the physical circumstances” in 
biological and mental phenomena (Hayek, 1967 [1964] p. 39). As consequence, one infers, when 
such a description is achievable, application of the reductionist approach is possible. 
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examine large amounts of variables (to which correspond large numbers of particular 
events), but instead seeks to delineate a different mechanism, i.e. a logical approach not 
reducible to a more detailed description of phenomena (Hayek, 1973, p. 39). 
“Explanation of the principle”, if conceived in this terms rather than as a by-product of 
the informational and computational limits of scientists, incorporates this perspective, 
although it is subsumed in the informational (quantitative) one.  
Finally, the relation between the “compositive method” and the “explanations of the 
principle” highlights a peculiarity in Hayek’s theory. The former is a specific method 
for a specific discipline connoted by some sort of uniqueness with respect to other 
scientific domains because of the nature of its subject. By contrast, the latter includes 
the subject studied by social sciences from a different methodological perspective 
which associates it with other disciplines exhibiting some shared general features. 
The uniqueness of the social sciences with respect to the natural sciences is due to 
the fact that ideas, beliefs, and opinions – called “constitutive of phenomena” – 
“become the causes of a social phenomenon”. Therefore, the social scientist “starts 
from the concepts which guide individuals in their actions”, and this permits him/her to 
reconstruct social complex phenomena as “wholes”, and to describe them as the 
unintentional results of human action (Hayek, 1973, p. 20). This is – Hayek says – the 
“characteristic feature” of the methodological individualism with which the 
subjectivism of the social sciences is closely connected (Hayek, 1979 [1942-1944], pp. 
62-64). 
When the argument concerns the complexity determined by a huge number of 
particular facts, the differences among the social sciences, evolutionary biology, and 
other disciplines (system theory, cybernetics, etc.) are not considered. And 
“explanation of the principle” becomes a suitable approach for dealing with these 
domains. Since Hayek considers the Darwinian theory of evolution to be the best 
example of the explanation of the principle (Hayek, 1967 [1955], p. 11-12; 1967 
[1964], p. 31; 1973, p. 16), I shall essentially refer to this theory in the following 
remarks. 
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The fundamental point is that the “wholes” (the “orders”) treated by the social 
sciences and evolutionary biology are fundamentally different, in that the former are 
constructions of human action, which depend on “beliefs and opinions”. The latter are 
generated by impersonal forces, whose elements do not possess intentionality, 
concepts, beliefs, and opinions; and this objective world exists independently from 
human action (cf. Fleetwood, 1995).30 In the perspective of the “explanation of the 
principle”, social orders lose part of their specificity. They are dealt with in the same 
ways as impersonal, biological, “wholes”, because they share with these latter an 
analogous, objective and huge number of elements, whose connections spontaneously 
produce a certain order. If we assume this point of view, we cannot refer to 
methodological individualism, subjectivism, and compositive method, since they 
cannot treat “wholes” such as those studied by biology. In short, the focus is on a 
methodological point: on the one hand, subjectivism has a precisely-defined domain 
not reducible to others; on the other, “explanation of the principle” provides a different 
perspective showing that social phenomena can be compared to other realms (in 
particular, biology). Yet this requires observation of these domains in objective terms:31 
that is, considering them on the basis of their huge number of elements, independently 
from their specificity. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The theory of complexity was an important part of Hayek’s work. It was treated in 
his writings from the 1940s onwards, where he emphasised the role of a large amount 
of variables and their interactions in distinguishing complex from simple phenomena, 
and it was subsequently harmonized with his evolutionary approach. This framework 
enabled Hayek to propound a powerful theory of the market and, in general, of 
spontaneous orders. Yet the two terms, which define complex phenomena, exhibit a 
                                                
30 Of course, humans can modify nature, yet evolutionary forces are not created by man. 
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different logical dimension: the one is, so to speak, quantitative, whilst the other is 
explanatory. The one construes complexity by referring to the huge amount of data 
which a model must consider in terms of variables; in this sense, the world is more 
complicated than complex. The other dimension deals with complexity by using an 
explanatory category, connoted in logical-relational terms, where the system’s 
emergent and self-organizing properties depend on interactions among its components. 
Nonetheless, this framework reminds us that, for Hayek, both models of simple and 
complex phenomena are characterized by connections among variables, and their 
difference is essentially due to the number of variables which they contain. Therefore, 
the numerical criterion predominates. 
Moreover, Hayek conceives the move from inanimate (simple phenomena) to the 
animate and social world (complex phenomena) in terms of continuity, as a mere 
increase in the number of variables considered by a model representing them. On the 
contrary, comprehension of this move requires a different epistemological category 
able to explain the emergence of the living and social world. Hayek’s theory comprises 
this analytic term in outline form (the logical-relational one, although, I repeat, 
connections among elements characterize simple phenomena as well). Yet he 
distinguishes neither between numerical and logical-relational concepts nor between 
the relative levels of analysis. The same problem arises when, on discussing 
“organized” and “unorganized” complexity, Hayek mixes the explanatory concept of 
(complex) “organization” with the “large number of particulars”, where the latter 
(contrary to the former) does not say much about the properties of an organized 
structure, and does not explain why some complex phenomena are organized and 
others are not. 
The dualistic view permeates Hayek’s work, and it also appears when problems of 
bounded rationality are addressed. In particular, the large (infinite) number of “facts” 
(the empirical variant of the large number of variables in a model) connotes Hayek’s 
notion of bounded rationality, where limits to computation emerge not with respect to 
                                                                                                                                    
31  As previously pointed out, for Hayek objectivity is the result of a reconstruction which 
depends on how a theory selects facts. 
30 
excessive information (however tractable this may be by means of heuristic 
procedures) but with respect to all the information of an economic system. Hence, 
rationality cannot overcome the informational gap of fragmented knowledge, while 
individual, computational, limits can be resolved by resorting to the market. 
The numerical view also connotes Hayek’s concept of knowledge, specifically 
“dispersed knowledge”. This consists in fragmented (individual) information, that is, a 
set of measurable data (or observed events) possessed by individuals in terms of 
“unique information” about “particular facts”. Hence dispersed knowledge is a 
quantitative/informational concept. Yet this kind of “knowledge”, considering all 
individuals, is infinite, and nobody can collect it owing to its spatial dispersion. Closely 
connected, but analytically different, is the notion of “inarticulate knowledge”, which 
implies tacit cognitive processes characterized by unconscious abstract rules used by 
agents to interpret reality and adopt suitable behaviours. These general rules are the 
result of cultural selection, and they are shared by the members of society. Yet they 
involve an epistemological perspective different from that of “dispersed knowledge” 
because they do not require the numerical dimension. Although inarticulate (tacit) 
knowledge is as fragmented as dispersed knowledge, because it belongs to individuals, 
its peculiarity is that it generates skills, unconscious capacities, and tacit rules of 
behaviour, where rules, like the mind, are abstract mechanisms which determine the 
“primacy of the abstract” in society. 
Finally, this dualistic approach is reproduced in the “explanations of the principle” 
which are adopted because “particular facts” studied by social and biological sciences 
are too numerous to be analyzed in detail. Yet, they somehow capture the evolutionary 
process and provide a description of its structure. Therefore, once again, two different 
theoretical dimensions cohabit, although one (here called “numerical”) generally 
prevails over the other. 
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